Zeitschrift für Psychologie / Belief and counterfactuality : a teleological theory of belief attribution by Rafetseder, Eva & Perner, Josef
Original Article
Belief and Counterfactuality
A Teleological Theory of Belief Attribution
Eva Rafetseder1 and Josef Perner2,3
1Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, UK
2Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Austria
3Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Austria
Abstract: The development and relation of counterfactual reasoning and false belief understanding were examined in 3- to 7-year-old children
(N = 75) and adult controls (N = 14). The key question was whether false belief understanding engages counterfactual reasoning to infer what
somebody else falsely believes. Findings revealed a strong correlation between false belief and counterfactual questions even in conditions in
which children could commit errors other than the reality bias (rp = .51). The data suggest that mastery of belief attribution and counterfactual
reasoning is not limited to one point in development but rather develops over a longer period. Moreover, the rare occurrence of reality errors
calls into question whether young children’s errors in the classic false belief task are indeed the result of a failure to inhibit what they know to
be actually the case. The data speak in favor of a teleological theory of belief attribution and challenges established theories of belief
attribution.
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It has been repeatedly reported that young children’s
answers to counterfactual questions correlate consistently
with their answers in the classic false belief test developed
by Wimmer and Perner (1983). In the classic false belief
task Max places his chocolate into a drawer, but in his
absence the chocolate is relocated to the cupboard. Chil-
dren who understand that Max holds a false belief also pre-
dict that he is going to search for his chocolate in the empty
drawer. Peterson and Riggs (1999), in their adaptive mod-
eling theory, were the first to propose that understanding
false belief depends on counterfactual thinking. Counter-
factual thoughts go beyond what we know to be true and
allow us to reflect on how else a situation could have
unfolded. For example, one may ask where the chocolate
would be, if it had not been moved. A number of studies
found that answers to counterfactual questions correlate
developmentally with answers to the false belief questions,
but counterfactual questions tend to be easier. An overview
of the correlation coefficients and differences in task diffi-
culty in these studies is shown in Figure 1.
These findings are important as they help us better
understand the cognitive basis of belief attribution – as
measured by the classic false belief test.1 As we will argue,
the involvement of counterfactual reasoning in belief attri-
bution fits the teleological theory of how belief is under-
stood particularly well. By developing a new test we can
evaluate this theory against two existing interpretations of
these findings and shed light on basic questions about the
nature and development of belief formation. Our data show
that the mastery of belief attribution and counterfactual
reasoning is not limited to one point in development (i.e.,
around 4 years) but is more prolonged. Although our
work only goes into developments a few years longer (i.e.,
7 years) there is evidence that more intricate aspects of
counterfactual reasoning might be mastered far into an
individual’s life.
Rafetseder, Schwitalla, and Perner (2013) illustrated
this prolonged development with two conditions: in the
1-puppet condition Carol dirtied the clean floor with her
muddy shoes, while in the 2-puppets condition Max and
1 We assume by default that children become able to represent another person’s belief around 4 years when they can provide correct answers to
the test question in the classic false belief task. However, use of indirect measures like anticipatory looking (Clements & Perner, 1994;
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007) or longer looking at unexpected outcomes (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) indicate a much earlier sensitivity to
others’ belief around 14–18 months or even earlier. The cognitive basis of these early signs remains hotly disputed (Ruffman, 2014; Setoh, Scott,
& Baillargeon, 2016; Wellman, 2014) and has recently been compounded by replication difficulties (Kulke & Rakoczy, 2018). We, therefore, feel
confident that passing the classic false belief test indicates an important development, whose relationship to counterfactual thinking is worth
investigating.
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Carol dirtied the clean floor. In both conditions partici-
pants were asked the same counterfactual question,
“If Carol had taken her dirty shoes off, would the floor be
dirty or clean?” All participants agreed that the floor would
be “clean” in the 1-puppet condition, but in the 2-puppets
condition adults and older children said that the floor
would be dirty, while over 80% of the 5- to 6-year-olds
concluded the floor to be clean. This finding replicated
a previous set of studies (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, &
Perner, 2010; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010) and the authors
argued that children approach counterfactual questions
differently from adults. In whatever way they answer
counterfactual questions, their answers should be reflected
in their false belief understanding, if these two abilities are
linked.
Before expanding on this prediction in more detail, we
outline the different theories which we try to assess empir-
ically. Peterson and Riggs (1999) explained the develop-
mental connection between counterfactual reasoning and
belief ascription with the use of modified derivation, a rea-
soning strategy considered to support counterfactual and
false belief reasoning. To illustrate, consider a boy, Ben,
dirtying a floor with his muddy shoes. Avoiding troubles
Ben wipes the floor clean and leaves. Unknown to him,
his sister Sarah later dirties the clean floor again with her
muddy shoes. False belief question: What does Ben think
the floor looks like? Counterfactual question: If Sarah had
not walked on the floor with her dirty shoes on, what would
the floor look like?
Having been told the entire scenario one knows the
details of the story (Ben dirtied the floor. He wiped it clean.
Then Sarah dirtied the floor). These details are stored in
one’s “database” (Peterson & Riggs’ terminology). Since
Ben did not see Sarah dirtying the floor, this detail is not
stored in Ben’s own database (italicized in the example
above). When being asked how Ben thinks the floor looks,
one must identify differences between one’s own and Ben’s
database and temporarily modify one’s own database by
ignoring the facts that are not also part of Ben’s database.
One then poses oneself the question “What does the floor
look like?” using the modified database and attribute the
resulting answer “clean” to Ben. Similarly, when asked if
Sarah had not walked on the floor with her dirty shoes,
one is instructed to ignore the fact that Sarah dirtied the
floor in one’s own database. The question “What does the
floor look like?” results in “clean,” but this time is not
attributed to Ben. Not having to attribute the counterfactual
answer to another person provided one explanation of why
Figure 1. Forest plot for 18 estimates of r – as represented by squares – from 10 papers investigating the correlation of classic false belief tasks
with counterfactual tasks. CF-FB Diff shows the mean difference between correct responses to counterfactual (CF) and false belief (FB) questions
(sign test: p = .006). Cohen’s d was corrected for dependence among means using Morris and DeShon’s (2002) Equation 8. Studies are plotted in
order of the size of the correlation. Horizontal lines represent the 95% CI. Stars represent the significance level of the correlation: *p < .05;
**p < .01; ***p < .001.
 2018 Hogrefe Publishing. Distributed under the
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children typically find counterfactual questions easier than
false belief questions (see Figure 1, CF-FB Diff). Alterna-
tively, counterfactual questions of this sort may be easier
because their antecedent explicitly specifies what one
should assume. False belief questions do not offer such
specification (Krzýanowska, 2012).
“Inhibition” theory is another theory to explain the devel-
opmental correlation between counterfactual tasks and false
belief tasks. It assumes a common difficulty of having to
inhibit the “lure of the real” (for a discussion, see Robinson
& Beck, 2000). In both tasks the correct response involves
something that is not the case, for instance, in our footprint
example to say that the floor would be clean or that Ben
thinks it is clean, when in reality it has Sarah’s footprints
on it. It is argued that those 3- to 5-year-old children who
do not give the correct answer tend to use “reality reason-
ing” (RR), that is, that (Ben thinks) there are Sarah’s
footprints on the floor. Robinson and Beck (2000), however,
already raised some doubts that difficulties with counterfac-
tual questions are due to a failure to inhibit, because even
3-year-olds are perfectly able to answer conditional ques-
tions directed into the future (i.e., future hypotheticals).
Perner and Roessler (2010; Roessler & Perner, 2013)
recently provided a new role for counterfactual reasoning
in their teleological model of intentional action understand-
ing. We will modify their model into a teleological theory of
belief attribution. At the heart of teleology is the conviction
that we do not see other agents acting according to some
lawful regularities. Instead, we see them as acting for good
reasons, which makes their actions rational and meaning-
ful. This works nicely in cases of shared knowledge (agent’s
database same as own), where no false beliefs are involved.
For instance, consider Sarah in the above footprint exam-
ple. If we learn that she wants to please her mother, who
appreciates a clean floor, she has objectively good reasons
to clean the floor, because it is dirty. And we may predict
that she will likely do so to please her mother. Now con-
sider Ben who also wants to please his mother. He has also
objectively good reason to clean the floor, which is dirty.
However, we should not predict that he will go and clean
it. So his behavior appears to be irrational if he means to
please his mother. To rationalize Ben’s failure to go clean
the floor, Perner and Roessler (2010) suggested that we
reason counterfactually: if, as Ben wrongly believes, the
floor were clean after he had cleaned it, Ben would have
good reasons to not go and clean it again.
Perner and Roessler’s use of counterfactual reasoning is
designed to preserve rationality of action when agents’ view
of the world deviates from reality (i.e., one’s own view).
We want to go one step further and ask whether counterfac-
tual reasoning may also play a role in belief attribution,
because we see other agents not only act rationally (for good
reasons), but also form rational beliefs.2 A rational agent
should not believe anything but only what he has good rea-
sons to believe. To capture this requirement of rationality we
can extend Perner and Roessler’s use of counterfactual rea-
soning for action to belief formation. We do so by using
Peterson and Riggs’ (1999) notion of an agent’s database.
“Database” can be understood as part of an agent’s belief
system. What we need is a basis of objective events, which
give rise to the agent’s belief. Perner, Rendl, and Garnham
(2007, p. 500) spoke of a “record of tracked events”, that
is, a record of those events that an agent could track (that
happened within his informational, perceptual field).
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) coined the term “registra-
tion” (of the events that the agent had occasion to register)
and Perner and Roessler (2010) of an “experiential record.”
We, therefore, adopt the following terminological conven-
tion: The experiential record for an agent is a record of
all events that the agent could register.
All these notions partition the series of all events into
those that the agent registered and those he could not.
We now can use counterfactual reasoning to determine
what, given an agent’s specific record of events, he has
good reasons to believe: If the actual sequence of events
consisted of those that Ben could register (that he wiped
his footprints off) ignoring events he did not register (Sarah
dirtying the floor), then he would have good reason to not
clean the floor again. Now we have a similar, yet different
and differently motivated theory from Peterson and Rigg’s
modified derivation of why belief attribution involves coun-
terfactual reasoning. Inspired by Perner and Roessler we
dub it the teleological theory of belief attribution.
We construct a test for these theories using the finding by
Rafetseder et al. (2013). The development of counterfactual
reasoning, as well as belief attribution, has traditionally
been investigated with response options limited to the state
of reality and the counterfactual or believed state. Under
this limitation it seemed that counterfactual reasoning
develops between 3 and 5 years as does belief attribution
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) using reality reasoning
(RR) before that age. However, when other plausible
response options were made available, much older children
had problems providing the correct answers to counterfac-
tual questions in some tasks (Rafetseder et al., 2010, 2013;
Rafetseder & Perner, 2010).
2 Naturally we accept that people have some irrational beliefs at times. But if this happens on a regular basis the person becomes subject to
various psychiatric conditions like, suffering from delusions, illusions, paranoia, and so forth.
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Study
The main aim of the current study was to investigate
whether the link between false belief and counterfactual
questions would still be as close as in previous studies
(see Figure 1), if we broadened response options. For exam-
ple, if errors other than RR were possible, would children
respond with the same option to both questions? To eluci-
date this question we tested 3- to 7-year-old children using
a novel false belief task (see Figure 2A), closely aligned to
the counterfactual task in Rafetseder et al. (2013) with
two conditions. They differ as to which kind of reasoning
results in correct answers. Rafetseder et al. (2010) distin-
guished two types of conditional reasoning: basic condi-
tional reasoning (BCR) and counterfactual reasoning
(CFR). In the conditional reasoning (CR) condition both
types of reasoning provide the correct answer, while in
the counterfactual reasoning (CFR) condition only counter-
factual reasoning leads to the correct answer.
For example, a puppet, Ben, enters the room leaving blue
footprints on the floor. Ben then either wipes the floor clean
(CR condition) or leaves the footprints (CFR condition)
before disappearing into the garden. Later Sarah enters
the room, leaving red footprints on the floor. Children were
asked a counterfactual question (If Sarah had not walked on
the floor with her dirty shoes on, what would the floor look
like?) and a false belief question (What does Ben think the
floor looks like?). Children indicated their answer by point-
ing at one of the four cards displaying a floor with (a) no
footprints, (b) red footprints, (c) blue footprints, or (d) red
and blue footprints (Figure 2B). Adults who use counterfac-
tual reasoning (CFR) point at (a) in the CR condition and at
(c) in the CFR condition.
Figure 2 indicates the different types of reasoning possi-
ble. Of particular interest are RR answers and BCR
answers. RR answers occur when children indicate how
the floor really looks: option (b) in the CR condition and
(d) in the CFR condition. BCR answers occur when, instead
(A)
(B)
Figure 2. (A) Set up for CR (left) and CFR (right) condition. (B) The resulting answer as determined by different reasoning strategies: RR = reality
response; BCR = basic conditional reasoning; CFR = counterfactual reasoning.
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of keeping matters of fact as close as possible to what actu-
ally happened (as would CFR), children think they are
asked to reason about a new incident with the same char-
acters and environment in which the antecedent holds true
(i.e., Sarah took her dirty shoes off). This results in response
(a) in both conditions. CFR conditions differ from CR con-
ditions in that only CFR arrives at the correct answer. This
difference is important, as the three theories about why
false belief attribution relates developmentally to counter-
factual reasoning make different predictions. Figure 3
shows hypothetical data patterns predicted by each theory
for our paradigm.
According to Peterson and Riggs’ (1999) adaptive model-
ing theory children’s answers to counterfactual and false
belief questions correlate, because the same modified
derivation procedure is needed. Additional factors account
for the differences between the tasks. For instance, false
belief answers additionally require attribution of the coun-
terfactual answer to somebody else (see Figure 3A). Once
children modify their database accordingly (i.e., ignore
the fact that Sarah came), they will give the correct answer
in the CR and the CFR condition. At present the theory
does not provide a plausible account of why modified
derivation should be more difficult in one condition than
the other.
The teleological theory based on Perner and Roessler
(2010; Roessler & Perner, 2013) avoids this problem. It
assumes that counterfactual reasoning is an integral part
of belief attribution but leaves it open which precise reason-
ing strategy (BCR or CFR) people use to approach this
issue. If CFR is required for a correct answer to the CF
question – which is the case in the CFR condition – false
belief questions should not be answered correctly before
the counterfactual questions. Their correlation thus stays
stable (see Figure 3B).
Finally, the inhibition theory (as discussed in Robinson &
Beck, 2000) implies that counterfactual and false belief
questions should correlate for the younger children who
commit the RR error. This theory does not specify why
the false belief question tends to be harder than the coun-
terfactual question in existing data and it does not include
predictions for BCR errors. So, no prediction follows for
relative difficulty (see Figure 3C).
Method
Participants
A total of 75 children between 38 and 92 months and 13
adults between 19 and 57 years (Mage = 32.54 years,
SD = 14.60, 7 females) participated in this study. Adults
were included to specify the answers that mature counter-
factual reasoners would give in our paradigm. Testing
occurred in a separate room and some children expressed
a desire to leave the room before data collection could be
finished (n = 4). Six further children were tested, but
excluded, for incorrectly answering one or more C2 control
questions. The final sample consisted of 65 children
Adaptive Modeling Theory
Teleological Theory
Inhibition Theory
(A)
(B)
(C)
Figure 3. Hypothetical data pattern according to (A) Adaptive Model-
ing Theory, (B) Teleological Theory, and (C) Inhibition Theory.
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(Mage = 62.43 months, SD = 14.44, 35 girls) who were pre-
dominantly from a middle-class background and were
recruited from playgroups in the central belt of Scotland
(n = 48) and in Germany (n = 17). Parents gave written con-
sent for their children to participate and the children each
gave their assent to take part in the tasks. Ethical approval
was granted for this research by the General University
Ethics Panel of the University of Stirling (Approval Refer-
ence: GUEP 150).
Design
All participants completed four stories, each of whom asked
a false belief and a counterfactual question, alongside a
classic false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The
order of the four stories followed a Latin Square Design
and the classic false belief task was always presented mid-
way. The order of the test questions and the order of the
two conditions CR and CFR were fully counterbalanced
within participants. To prevent any bias resulting from
right- or left-handedness, the four answer cards were pre-
sented randomly.
Materials and Procedure
Participants received a total of four stories using Playmobil
puppets to visually support the narration.
Footprint Scenario
Participants were introduced to a boy, Ben, who had been
playing with blue crayon. Ben entered the room (repre-
sented with a white square) and left blue footprints on
the floor. He either wiped the floor clean with a cloth
(CR) or left the blue footprints unclean (CFR), before head-
ing back outside. The puppet left the scene entirely and
participants were asked C1 “Are there footprints on the
floor or no footprints on the floor?” All participants correctly
answered, depending on the condition, with “no footprints”
(CR) or with “footprints” (CFR). Then a girl, Sarah, entered
the scene, who had been playing with red crayon, and she
left red footprints on the floor. To control for any false
assumptions participants were asked C2 “Did Ben see
Sarah leaving red footprints on the floor?” Those partici-
pants who answered “yes” were excluded from the sample.
Finally, with the red footprints (and the blue footprints in
CFR) still visible, participants were asked two test questions
in a counterbalanced order, “What does Ben think the floor
looks like? Does he think there are footprints or no foot-
prints?” (False belief question) and “If Sarah had not
walked on the floor with her dirty shoes on, what would
the floor look like? Would there be footprints on the floor
or would there be no footprints on the floor?” (Counterfac-
tual question). In between the two questions participants
were asked a reality question “How does the floor actually
look?” To answer these questions, participants were asked
to point at one of four randomly laid out cards, displaying
a floor with (a) no footprints, (b) red footprints, (c) blue
footprints, or (d) red and blue footprints.
Waterpark Scenario
Anna was seen playing with her blue ball in the grass. She
either tidied it away (CR) or left it in the grass (CFR) before
going for a swim in the pool. Then Mark entered the scene
and played with a green ball in the grass.
Whiteboard Scenario
Tom was seen drawing a house on a whiteboard with a
green pen. He either wiped it off (CR) or left it (CFR) before
he went to play in a different room. Then Sally entered the
scene and drew a red flower on the whiteboard.
Tablecloth Scenario
The scene showed a table with a white surface when a girl,
Claire, entered and placed her red lemonade on the table,
leaving a big red stain. She either wiped the table clean
(CR) or she left the red stain (CFR) before heading out to
visit a friend. Then Jack entered and put his yellow lemon-
ade on the table causing a yellow stain on the surface.
Classic False Belief Task
A classic false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) was
presented on a laptop using PowerPoint (Perner, Mauer,
& Hildenbrand, 2011). It showed Lisa playing with her
teddy before placing it in a red basket and leaving for the
kitchen. While away, her brother Tom moved her teddy
from the red basket into a yellow basket, before heading
outside to play. Participants were then asked five control
questions: (1) Where did Lisa put her teddy? (2) Where is
teddy now? (3) Who put teddy there? (4) Did Lisa see that?
(5) Where did Lisa put her teddy at the beginning? If any of
these questions were answered incorrectly (n = 2), the
PowerPoint was restarted. Finally, Lisa reentered the scene,
and participants were asked, “Where will Lisa search first
for her teddy?” Lisa was then shown to search the red bas-
ket and participants were asked, “Why did Lisa search for
her teddy in the red basket?”
Scoring
Each participant answered a total of four counterfactual
and four false belief questions, two of each in CR and
two in CFR. Participants scored one point if they chose
answer card (a) in the CR condition and answer card
(c) in the CFR condition. This resulted in a maximum score
of 2 for each type of question in each condition.
In the classic false belief task, participants gained
one point for answering the prediction question with
“red.” The explanation question was scored based on
Perner, Lang, and Kloo (2002; see also Priewasser,
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Roessler, & Perner, 2013). Participants scored two points if
they ascribed a mental state to Lisa, for instance, “She
thinks it is still there,” or “She didn’t know it was moved.”
One point was obtained for identifying important facts
about the story, for example, “That’s where she put it
before it was moved,” or “She put it there first.” No points
were awarded when the participants used irrelevant facts
about the story or did not give a verbal response. Finally,
a sum false belief score was calculated (Maxcorr = 3).
Results
Adult Controls
Adult controls showed near ceiling performance, with no
errors in the CR condition, and two errors (by selecting
the a-card) in the CFR condition, one for each question
type, false belief, and counterfactual question. With regard
to the classic false belief task, all adult controls answered
the prediction question correctly. They received a sum
score of 2.343 (SD = 0.54). Because of the near ceiling per-
formance, no further analysis was conducted.
Preliminary Analyses
The story material did not affect children’s answers to
counterfactual questions, Cochran’s w2(65) = 5.21, p = .16,
or their answers to false belief questions, Cochran’s
w2(65) = 4.44, p = .22. There were no effects of gender, nei-
ther on the answers to the two question types in the two
conditions (all ps > .45) nor on the mean classic false belief
score (p = .71). Therefore, these variables were not consid-
ered further.
Main Analyses
Mean performance on test questions was examined using a
mixed factorial repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with question type (false belief vs. counterfac-
tual) and required reasoning (CR vs. CFR) as within subject
factors and age (4 levels: 3-year-olds: Mage = 44.31;
4-year-olds: Mage = 55.81; 5-year-olds: Mage = 67.69;
6-year-olds: Mage = 80.76) as a between subject factor.
A main effect of question type, F(1, 61) = 6.83, p = .011,
η2 = .10, a main effect of required reasoning, F(1, 61) =
27.59, p < .001, η2 = .31, and a main effect of age,
F(1,61) = 10.35, p < .001, η2 = .34, were obtained. The interac-
tion between question type and required reasoning was
marginally significant, F(1, 61) = 3.15, p = .081, η2 = .05.
While counterfactual (Mcorr = 1.10, SE = .096) and false belief
questions (Mcorr = 1.04, SE= .093)were answeredat a compa-
rable level in the CFR condition, F(1, 61) = .45, p = .50,
η2 = .007, children answered more counterfactual questions
(Mcorr = 1.63, SE = .077) accurately than false belief
questions (Mcorr = 1.33, SE = .09) in the CR condition,
F(1, 61) = 9.52, p = .003, η2 = .14 (see Figure 4). The data
pattern found corresponds particularly well with the
hypothetical data pattern (B) in Figure 2.
Required reasoning also interacted marginally signifi-
cantly with age, F(1, 61) = 2.58, p = .061, η2 = .11. We found
an age effect in both conditions CR, F(1, 61) = 4.75,
p = .005, η2 = .19, and CFR, F(1, 61) = 10.37, p < .001,
η2 = .34. However, as Table 1 shows, all questions corre-
lated with age except for counterfactual questions in the
CR condition, evidently because even the youngest children
had little problems with this question. When age was con-
trolled, correlations between counterfactual and false belief
questions were still moderate to large (bracketed numbers).
Analysis of Reasoning Strategies
Which reasoning strategy children used can be identified by
their response pattern for the CR and the CFR condition as
shown in Figure 5. This can be done for the counterfactual
question and the false belief question for the first and the
second pair of tasks.
Figure 6 displays the contingency of reasoning strategies
for answering the counterfactual and the belief question
separated for the first (Figure 6A) and the second pair of
stories (Figure 6B). The contingency between strategies
used to answer the counterfactual question and the belief
question was high for the first (Φ = .66, p = .001) as well
as the second pair of stories (Φ = .83, p < .001). Also the
contingency of strategies used in the first pair and the sec-
ond pair of stories was high for the counterfactual ques-
tions, Φ = .72, p < .001, as it was for false belief
questions, Φ = .69, p < .001.
Figure 4. Mean number of correct responses to counterfactual and
false belief questions in each condition (CR and CFR) as well as the
prediction question of the classic false belief tasks displayed
separately for age.
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Figure 6 shows particularly clearly that children capable
of CFR used it for both counterfactual and false belief ques-
tions (first: n = 19; second: n = 28). Children who applied
BCR on the false belief question either used BCR (first:
n = 6; second: n = 6) or CFR (first: n = 5; second: n = 6)
on the counterfactual question. Other than that, use of
one strategy for one question could go with any other strat-
egy for the other question.
Relation Between Classic and Footprint False Belief
Task
The prediction question of the classic false belief question
correlated significantly higher with the false belief question
in the CR condition (r = .45, p < .001) than in the CFR con-
dition (r = .13, p > .05), z = 2.35, p = .019.3 Yet, the classic
false belief question was significantly easier than the false
belief question in the CR condition, t(64) = 2.96,
p = .004, presumably due to the higher number of response
options (4) in the false belief task of the CR condition than
the classic task (2).
Discussion
Results from the CR condition confirm existing findings
(Figure 1): children gave more correct answers to the coun-
terfactual than the false belief question and their answers to
these two questions were correlated. The comparison
between the CR and CFR condition also replicated previous
findings (Rafetseder et al., 2013) of CR conditions being
easier than CFR conditions. However, this difference is
not as large as in the original studies because children
found our version of the footprint CFR condition easier
(50% correct around 5 years) than the one used by
Rafetseder et al. (2013, Figure 2: 50% correct around
9 years). Two changes can plausibly explain that difference:
the differently colored footprints may have made it easier
to realise that if Sarah had taken off her shoes then only
the red footprints would be missing and not also Ben’s blue
ones. Whereas in the original study the two characters
made the same color footprints which may have trapped
children more easily into the typical BCR strategy of rea-
soning, “if Sarah takes off her dirty shoes then no dirty foot-
prints would be added.” Indeed the BCR errors were much
more pronounced in that study (on average 82% of the 5- to
6-year-olds) than in the present study (around 19% in the
same age range). Another reason for the better perfor-
mance in the CFR condition is the fact that Ben dirtied
the floor before Sarah did and before Sarah had entered
the scene. Hence, the counterfactual antecedent about
Sarah having taken off her shoes could not have had any
causal influence on Ben’s earlier behavior. In the original
study Sarah dirtied the floor first. This made it possible to
assume that if she had taken off her shoes then Ben would
have been faced with a clean floor and might also have
Table 1. Correlations [partial correlations controlling for age] between age, counterfactual questions in the CR condition (CFCR) and in the CFR
condition (CFCFR), false belief questions in the CR condition (FBCR) and in the CFR condition (FBCFR), and the classic false belief question (prediction
and sum score)
Counterfactual question False belief question False belief classic
Variable CR CFR CR CFR Prediction Sum
Age .19 .48*** .48*** .56*** .50*** .46***
CFCR .42*** .37** .31** .38** .39***
CFCFR [.38]** .52*** .64*** .38** .30*
FBCR [.32]* [.37]** .49*** .59*** .53***
FBCFR [.25]* [.51]*** [.30]* .37** .39**
FBclassic prediction [.34]** [.18] [.45]*** [.13] .77***
FBclassic sum [.34]** [.10] [.40]*** [.18] [.71]***
Notes. CF = counterfactual question, CR = conditional reasoning, CFR = counterfactual reasoning, FB = False belief question. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p  .001
(two-tailed).
Figure 5. Pattern of responses over the two conditions indicative of a
particular reasoning strategy.
3 The z-score is the result of a test of the equality of two correlation coefficients obtained from the same sample, with the two correlations sharing
one variable (FBclassic), as described by Lee and Preacher (2013).
 2018 Hogrefe Publishing. Distributed under the
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taken off his shoes. With that assumption even CFR
reasoners would answer with “clean,” which was classified
as a wrong response indicating the use of BCR. In fact,
Nyhout, Henke, and Ganea (in press) showed that
this reversal of who dirtied the floor first had exactly this
effect.
The central and important new finding is the strong cor-
relation between answers to the counterfactual and false
belief questions in the CFR condition. The correlation was
at least as strong (rp = .51) as in the CR condition
(rp = .32). This supports the idea that children’s counterfac-
tual reasoning strategy is an integral part of belief attribu-
tion as suggested by the teleological theory. The modified
derivation theory has difficulty accounting for this because
modified derivation gives the same result for CFR as well as
CR problems. Unless the theory can provide a plausible
explanation of why modified derivation should be more dif-
ficult in CFR than in CR the theory cannot account for our
data. Also the inhibition theory has difficulty accounting for
this prolonged relationship between belief attribution and
counterfactual reasoning. It drew its explanatory strength
from the fact that the young children in the original studies
found reality-based answers difficult to inhibit leading to
many RR errors. In the present study RR errors play practi-
cally no role for counterfactual questions (Figure 6) and
also only a limited role for false belief questions. Hence
problems inhibiting reality-based responses can neither
account for the difficulty of the CFR condition nor the
strong correlation between answers to counterfactual and
false belief questions in this condition. To explain the data
the theory would need to claim that BCR responses are
difficult to inhibit. But why should that be, and why should
they be even more difficult to inhibit than reality-based
responses? With reference to Figure 4, inhibition cannot
explain why the FB question in the CR condition is more
difficult than the CF question, and why both questions
are more difficult in the CFR than in the CR condition.
So, we see that from the three theories that have addressed
the relationship between belief attribution and counterfac-
tual reasoning teleology can most easily accommodate
our data.
Apart from this specific contribution our data also speak
to wider issues of belief ascription. A persistent develop-
mental question is whether children acquire a competent
understanding of belief at a particular point in development
or whether this acquisition is a prolonged and gradual pro-
cess. For instance, we know that children’s performance on
false belief tasks is influenced by factors like the strength of
the hindsight bias and their ability to inhibit such a bias
(e.g., Bernstein, Atance, Meltzoff, & Loftus, 2007). Our data
suggest in addition that even the determination of the con-
tent of beliefs develops gradually depending on the kind of
counterfactual reasoning needed. This question whether
the concept of belief is acquired as a package (Rakoczy,
Bergfeld, Schwarz, & Fizke, 2015) or incrementally (Perner,
Huemer, & Leahy, 2015) is also an issue for second-order
belief attribution and the understanding of the “intensional-
ity”4 of belief.
Another wider issue concerns the question whether our
data provide evidence for teleology-in-perspective as the
(A) (B)
Figure 6. Contingency between strategy used for the CF question (x-axis) and for the FB question (color of bar). Strategies were determined
separately for the first two stories (one CR and one CFR story) and the second two stories (CR and CFR).
4 Intensionality is the technical term for the fact that co-referential terms cannot be replaced in sentences about belief without potentially
affecting the truth of the sentence, for example, Heinz sees a die, which happens to be made of rubber and serves as an eraser. By just looking
at it, Heinz cannot tell that it is also an eraser. Hence, one cannot rephrase “Heinz knows where the die is,” as, “Heinz knows where the eraser
is,” even though “the die” and “the eraser” do refer to the same object.
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way we understand other agents’ beliefs in contrast to the
entrenched duo of theory use and simulation. Teleology’s
hallmark is to reintroduce the insight from action theory
(Anscombe, 1957) that we understand agents as acting for
good reasons (Perner & Roessler, 2010) and not just
according to some lawful causal regularities as featured in
theory theory (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1998). Teleology’s
weakness is to account for belief-based actions, where
agents act on reasons within their subjective perspective.
To avoid the technique of imaginative identification pro-
pounded by simulation theory, teleology provides counter-
factual reasoning about reasons for action and for belief
(novel contribution) for this purpose. The question then is
whether the present data also favor teleology over theory
use and simulation.
To see why theory theory has no natural place for coun-
terfactual reasoning the following typical theory theory
account of the classic false belief scenario will help
(Carruthers, 2013, p. 160): “Consider a false-belief task of
the sort presented to infants: a doll that an agent has been
playing with is first placed in a blue box and then, while
the agent is absent, is moved to a green box. . . . noting
that the agent is not present when the doll is moved. . . .
during the initial sequence the infant infers [that] the agent
thinks: the doll is in the blue box, relying on the attributional
principle, seeing leads to believing, or some-such. It then
does not update this representation when the doll is moved.
. . . now judging the content, the agent thinks: the doll is in the
green box.” Again it is difficult to see what use could be
made here of counterfactual reasoning, which raises the
question why belief attribution should emerge in tune with
counterfactual reasoning.
Simulation might provide a role for counterfactual rea-
soning in two places, shifting from one’s own perspective
to the simulated agent’s perspective or when reasoning
within the other’s perspective. We can rule out the latter
because Ben does not engage in counterfactual reasoning
and, therefore, there is no use for counterfactual reasoning
once one has assumed Ben’s perspective. Would counter-
factual reasoning be required to shift to Ben’s perspective?
It seems superfluous. If one knows that Ben has not seen
Sarah dirty the floor then one imagines the world from
Ben’s perspective as not including Sarah’s footprints. Again,
it is not clear what role counterfactual reasoning could play
in this process either.
Simulation theory might, however, have a use for coun-
terfactual reasoning on some occasions to explain recalci-
trant data. Indeed Short and Riggs (2016) recently
defended simulation theory against Saxe’s (2005) claim
that it could not explain why children assume that not
knowing leads to getting it wrong (Ruffman, 1996). In their
defense of simulation Short and Riggs used adaptive
modeling in combination with specific assumptions of
how people represent disjunctive knowledge (the bead is
either red or green). Nevertheless, this elegant move does
not show that counterfactual reasoning is a natural partner
for simulation theory.
As we have just seen in the case of simulation theory,
counterfactual reasoning can be given a role to account
for particular data. Yet, neither theory theory nor simulation
theory motivates the need for counterfactual reasoning in
general. By contrast, teleology needs to preserve the view
that mistaken agents have rational beliefs and act for good
reasons. For this, teleology depends on counterfactual
reasoning.
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